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FOREWORD:
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT AS A CRIMINAL COURT:
THE ROLE OF A FEDERAL APPELLATE
COURT IN THE NINETIES
ADAM H. KURLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1991, a highly publicized debate ensued over
whether United States District Court Judge Kenneth Ryskamp should be
elevated to sit on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. The nomination was defeated in the Senate Judiciary Committee
amidst echoes of partisan recrimination.' Some Republican Senators
protested loudly that Ryskamp's rejection was grounded in the most base
form of partisan politics-that the Eleventh Circuit was perhaps the last
federal court that, despite a steady infusion over the last decade of con-
servative appointments, had not yet obtained a solid conservative major-
ity, and that Ryskamp's rejection was designed solely to delay that
eventuality.
2
The battle over the ideological shape of the Eleventh Circuit, which
culminated in Ryskamp's defeat, has unique historical roots that can be
traced back to the disputes that ultimately led to splitting the former
Fifth Circuit. That split, in turn, can be traced back to the Fifth Cir-
cuit's role in carrying out the historical desegregation mandate of Brown
v. Board of Education.3 Fortunately, this type of exhausting circuit battle
is rare today. In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit appears on a judicial stage that lacks the grand historical
or urgent political eloquence possessed by the offspring of the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The Seventh Circuit has long since been "redeemed" by a solid
conservative majority. As such, no ideological struggle, at least in its
most base partisan form, exists.4 Compared to the historical backdrop
* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. Former Assistant United
States Attorney, Eastern District of California. B.A, J.D., University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See Don J. DeBenedectis, Ryskamp Rejected, 77 A.B.A.J. 26 (June 1991).
2. See Sharon LaFraniere, Ryskamp Nomination is Rejected, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1991, at
Al (quoting Republican Judiciary Committee members Hatch and Grassley).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For an excellent discussion of the issues surrounding the split of the
former Fifth Circuit, see DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988).
4. As of 1991, the Seventh Circuit is comprised of I I active judges, the last seven of whom
were appointed by President Ronald Reagan. See Judges of the Federal Courts, Seventh Circuit, 926
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that frames Eleventh Circuit nominations like that of Judge Ryskamp,
the recent controversies surrounding the Seventh Circuit nominations
seem trite.5 Yet as the Seventh Circuit moves into the last decade of the
twentieth century, the presence of a solid conservative majority has not
necessarily translated into the sea of calm that some might have
imagined.
In several criminal law cases, deep and unusually personal divisions
within the court have surfaced on more than one occasion. Spearheaded
largely by Judges Richard A. Posner and Frank H. Easterbrook, a seg-
ment of the court appears willing to fundamentally alter its approach in
confronting issues that reside on the fence line of established Supreme
Court precedents by boldly stepping beyond those precedents.
At present, this emerging doctrinal approach has been confined
largely to key constitutional procedural issues, most notably having to do
with determining the appropriate standard of review for various constitu-
tional claims. These issues are transformed into the larger issue of
whether constitutional doctrine should be altered as a caseload manage-
ment technique. In an era where only a handful of Seventh Circuit cases
are reviewed by the Supreme Court each term, the circuit's approach to
these issues could have a significant impact. Is this an "innovation" that
can be productively channelled into a coherent doctrinal approach to re-
solve criminal law issues? Or is it the manifestation of a dismal type of
law and economics run amok?6 If nothing else, Judges Posner and Eas-
F.2d xx (1991). Only two active judges were appointed by a Democratic president. Id. (Judge Cum-
mings in 1966 (by President Johnson) and Judge Cudahy in 1979 (by President Carter)). In con-
trast, a decade ago, the Seventh Circuit had four active judges appointed by Democrats and four
appointed by Republicans. See Judges of the Federal Courts, 620 F. 2d xviii-xix (1980).
5. The nomination of Judge Daniel Manion to a seat on the Seventh Circuit captured national
attention when opponents challenged the nomination on the grounds that he lacked sufficient intelli-
gence and judicial experience. The Washington Post, covering the hearings, concluded that "Mr.
Manion's legal briefs demonstrate a pervasive lack of technical ability, craftsmanship, attention to
detail, and reasoning." Daniel Manion: Arguments Pro and Con, WASH. POST, June 24, 1986 at
A 17. After reviewing what Manion considered to be his five best briefs, a panel of the American Bar
Association found that Maion's writing fell far short of the standard that should be expected of a
judge. Id. Democrats criticized Manion as unqualified because he had never been a lead attorney in
a federal case and had listed an automotive repair case as one of his most noteworthy cases. Richard
Cohen, Keep That Bench Warm, WASH. POST, July 1, 1986, at A15. The Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee voted 9-9 on the confirmation, sending the nomination to the full senate without a recommenda-
tion. Howard Kurtz, Senate Casts 50-59 Vote for Manion: Controversial Choice for Appellate Court
Wins Confirmation, WASH. POST, July 14, 1986, at Al. Manion was eventually confirmed by a 50-
49 vote, with then Vice-President Bush casting the tie-breaking vote in favor of confirmation. Id.
6. Both Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook have offered a comprehensive analysis of crimi-
nal law. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193
(1985) (economic analysis of substantive criminal law). Posner contends that "although judges and
legislators do not often speak the language of economics, they often do reason implicitly in economic
terms." Id. at 1230. See also Frank. H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983). In at least one area of federal criminal law-corporate criminality-
[Vol. 67:3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN THE NINETIES
terbrook are, at times, advocating the development of a federal court pru-
dential doctrine of an unusual stripe.
7
Once the genie is out of the bottle, it will be difficult to confine such
an approach to issues of constitutional dimension. How might this affect
the Seventh Circuit's approach to the resolution of several other vital
federal criminal law issues of less than constitutional dimension? Given
the structure of the federal court system, many of these issues are practi-
cally insulated from Supreme Court review altogether. To say that,
based on Judge Posner's and Judge Easterbrook's impetus, the Seventh
Circuit sits on the threshold of developing a type of aberrant decisional
law distinctive from the other circuits is an overstatement. Nonetheless,
even if their views do not command a consistent majority of the Seventh
Circuit, it is not premature to consider how Judge Posner's and Judge
Easterbrook's approach has affected several aspects of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's criminal law jurisprudence. In at least one opinion, Judge Posner
has already noted that the concerns expressed in the Report of the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee,8 of which he was a member, are significant
enough to be cited as authority. 9 That same Report expresses serious
concerns about intercircuit conflicts and the apparent inability of the
Supreme Court to resolve enough of these conflicts.10 Thus, whether the
Seventh Circuit is formulating an approach that may have an impact on
the frequency of intercircuit conflicts, either positive or negative, is wor-
thy of exploration.
Judge Posner's approach would radically alter federal criminal law. He explicitly states that "since
corporate criminal punishment is purely monetary, it is not clear why the corporation should be
entitled to the elaborate procedural safeguards of the criminal process . . . [t]hose safeguards make
economic sense only on the assumption that criminal punishments impose heavy social costs rather
than merely transfer money from the criminal to the state." Posner, supra at 1229.
7. Abstention is the most widely recognized prudential doctrine. See generally ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 13 (1989). Although grounded in federalism and comity
concerns, abstention is used as a vehicle to keep entire issues out of federal court. As discussed infra,
Judges Posner and Easterbrook have advocated the use of more deferential standards of review on
many criminal law constitutional claims. This serves the purpose of expediting appellate dockets.
Although it does not entirely eliminate a particular case from federal court consideration, the practi-
cal effect of applying deferential standards of review is much the same-a judge-made doctrine is
used to, in effect, limit the full resolution of issues in federal court. Unlike abstention, the use of
more deferential standards of review creates the additional effect of insulating possibly incorrect
decisions from significant judicial scrutiny.
8. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMIT-TEE, April 2, 1990 [hereinafter
REPORT].
9. United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 420 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., concurring)
("Because the dramatic increases in federal judicial workloads in recent years have fallen so heavily
on the federal courts of appeals, it is no surprise that there has been a steady trend toward limiting
the scope of appellate review of determinations of fact-specific issues." (citing REPORT)). Judge
Flaum took serious issue with Judge Posner's claimed detection of a "steady trend." See infra note
83 and accompanying text.
10. REPORT, supra note 8, at 124-30.
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II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S JUDICIAL PERSONALITY
Depending on which factors one emphasizes, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals is arguably now the most important federal appellate
court in the nation. I I In Judge Posner, a principal proponent of the Law
and Economics movement, the Seventh Circuit boasts one of the most
prolific and controversial judges in the nation.' 2 Similarly, the presence
of Judge Posner's former University of Chicago faculty colleague, Judge
Easterbrook, bears mention. 13 Presumably, opinions authored by either
Judge Posner or Judge Easterbrook (even dissenting opinions), causti-
cally insightful and intellectually rich, carry with them substantial per-
suasive weight with the other circuits. 14 They are amongst the
intellectual giants of the federal judiciary. So controversial and prolific is
this duo, that the cottage industry of critiquing their scholarly works has
practically become an academic discipline in and of itself.' 5 Sometimes it
11. The Ninth Circuit is the largest federal appellate court in the nation in terms of numbers
and geographic area. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1990) (authorizing 28 active Ninth Circuit judges). The
Second Circuit is of special importance because of the volume of sophisticated criminal securities
fraud litigation. See, e.g., United States v. Regan, 937 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.) (Princeton Newport securi-
ties fraud case), as amended, 946 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Chestman, 903 F. 2d 75
(2d Cir. 1990), vacated in part, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussion of criminal insider trading
law), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia is sometimes thought of as the most important federal appellate court because of its pri-
mary role in adjudicating issues regarding federal agencies. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 273 (1990) (U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia has a heavy workload of reviewing the decisions of federal
agencies, which may arise from disputes anywhere in the United States); id. at 292 (D.C. Circuit
"'commonly said to be second most important court [behind only the Supreme Court] in the na-
tion"). The D.C. Circuit's caseload of administrative agency appeals is of relatively minor import
with respect to federal criminal prosecutions. The D.C. Circuit is of some importance in criminal
law because it is the primary home of most, but not all, Independent Counsel prosecutions. It is not
the exclusive home because of the vagaries of the federal venue provisions which require some In-
dependent Counsel prosecutions to be brought in neighboring Maryland and Virginia, which bring
those appeals within the ambit of the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d
148 (4th Cir. 1990).
12. His prolificness is not confined to published opinions. For a small sampling, see, e.g., RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (3d ed. 1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUS-
TICE (1981); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); RICHARD
A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPU-
TATION (1990).
13. Judges Posner and Easterbrook have co-authored THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1976).
14. See, e.g., Murray v. City of Austin, Tex., 947 F.2d 147, 163-70 (5th Cir. 1991) (Goldberg,
J., dissenting)(repeated favorable references to Judge Easterbrook and his dissenting opinion in Har-
ris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1425 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 60
U.S.L.W. 3878 (1992)).
15. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1302 (1991) (reviewing THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE); Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much About
the Middle Ages:" Posner on Law and Literature, 97 YALE L.J. 777 (1988) (reviewing Law and Litera-
ture: A Relation reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986); J.M. Balkin, Too Good to be True: The
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seems that only Siskel and Ebert have yet to critique their work.
And make no mistake about it. Significant aspects of "law and eco-
nomics" have made their way into the lexicon of Seventh Circuit crimi-
nal law jurisprudence. For example, the Seventh Circuit has undertaken
an economic analysis of fourth amendment searches,' 6 as well as an eco-
nomic analysis of bank robbery.' 7 Certainly, the presence of law and
economics jargon in a federal criminal law opinion does not mean that
the outcome has been determined exclusively by economic analysis. Af-
ter all, "efficiency" has been a powerful force in the determination of
many legal issues long before law and economics was in vogue.18 How-
ever, law and economics may have influenced the result in at least one
case, with a resulting split in the circuits.
In United States v. Keane,19 the Seventh Circuit, speaking through
Judge Easterbrook, denied the petitioner's requested relief for a writ of
coram nobis, largely on economic efficiency grounds. Judge Easterbrook
admitted to some "unease" that our legal system tolerated erroneous
convictions, but observed that we live in a world of "scarcity." Here, the
petitioner was old, his conviction was old and his sentence had long been
served. In a world of limited resources, it made no sense to clutter up the
federal courts with reviewing these cases, Judge Easterbrook reasoned.
20
The coram nobis issue is of considerable importance in today's fed-
eral criminal law climate because dozens of individuals have sought
coram nobis relief in order to have their public corruption mail fraud
convictions vacated in light of the Supreme Court's decision in McNally
v. United States.21 The Fourth Circuit, applying a more traditional (and
less economic) analysis, reached a result in direct conflict with the Sev-
enth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit allowed coram nobis relief "in order to
achieve justice" and thus upheld the district court decision vacating the
Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDIS
& RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)); Martin H. Redish,
The Federal Courts, Judicial Restraint, and the Importance ofAnalyzing Legal Doctrine, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1378 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
FORM (1985). For a scathing analysis of an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, see Dennis M. Patterson,
A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503 (1991).
16. United States v. Koeing, 856 F.2d 843 (7th Cir. 1988).
17. United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988).
18. Some of the seminal works on the economic analysis of criminal law include Jeremy Ben-
tham, Principles of Penal Law, in I WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 365 (John Bowring ed., 1843);
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). See
also DAVID J. PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983).
19. 852 F.2d 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084 (1989).
20. Id.
21. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). For an overview of McMally's confusing aftermath, see Deborah
Sprenger, Annotation, Effect Upon Prior Convictions of McNally v. United States Rule that Mail
Fraud Statute is Directed Solely at Deprivation of Property Rights, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 797 (1990).
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public corruption mail fraud conviction of former Maryland Governor
Marvin Mandel.
22
Economic efficiency analysis also seems to present itself in other ar-
eas of the court's provocative criminal law jurisprudence. Judge Posner's
and Judge Easterbrook's frontier attempts to use constitutional doctrine
as a caseload management technique certainly have "efficiency" dimen-
sions. And even when the "efficiency" principles admittedly have noth-
ing to do with the outcome of the case, the economic dimension of the
issue proves too irresistible to ignore. For example, in United States v.
Reynolds,23 Judge Easterbrook observed that the prosecution's decision
to bring a federal conspiracy charge was "pointless" given the manner in
which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "group" offenses and the man-
ner in which the evidentiary benefit of conspiracy law could be obtained
without charging a conspiracy. 24
The possible influx of efficiency analysis into the resolution of crimi-
nal law issues is but one way to gauge the magnitude of the importance of
the Seventh Circuit. On a practical level, the Seventh Circuit is the ap-
pellate home of Greylord and a myriad of other public official corruption
prosecutions. 25 Thus the Seventh Circuit develops a constant flow of sig-
nificant cutting edge public corruption caselaw. As a consequence of the
brazen corruption for which Chicago is notorious, perhaps only in the
federal district courts of the Seventh Circuit could one expect to hear
testimony (from an attorney no less) that: [I] bribed judges, assistant
state's attorneys, public defenders, sheriff's deputies, police officers, court
clerks, assistant corporation counsels or aldermen virtually every day [I]
practiced law in Chicago.
26
22. United States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067, 1074 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906
(1989). The Seventh Circuit noted the conflict in United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir.
1989), and noted that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in both Mandel and Keane, but that
"[e]ventually these disputes must be put to rest [by the Supreme Court]." Id. at 1149.
23. 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1402 (1991).
24. Judge Easterbrook took further steps to rid the Circuit of unnecessary and inefficient con-
spiracy charges in United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 206
(1991). There he disagreed with seven other circuits, and determined that a continuing series of
violations in the CCE statute meant two, not three violations, but that a conspiracy could not be
used. The end result was that the conviction was affirmed, but a significant inter-circuit conflict had
been created. See discussion at note 98 infra.
25. For a review of the Greylord Prosecutions, see JAMES TUOHY & ROB WARDEN, GREY-
LORD: JUSTICE, CHICAGO STYLE (1989).
26. United States v. National On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n, 90 CR 760, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2341 (N.D. I1. Feb. 15, 1991) (testimony of Robert Cooley, reported in Matt O'Connor,
Cooley Hints He Was Weary of Corruption, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 1991, § 2, at 2 col. 3 (emphasis
added)). In later testimony, defense counsel told Cooley that "[y]ou wouldn't know an ethical law-
yer if you saw one," to which Cooley replied, "[t]hat makes two of us." See Mary Wisniewski,
Helped Fix 2 Murder Trials, Cooley Testifies, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 3, 1991, at 1, 16.
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Beginning with the Hobbs Act, Congress began to enact complex
criminal statutes to address the concern with public corruption. These
statutes now cover a range of conduct far broader than public corrup-
tion, and the Seventh Circuit is positioned to develop significant case law
on these issues. Recent examples of issues percolating in the district
courts within the Seventh Circuit include the procedural issues surround-
ing mega-trials, which almost invariably include RICO or CCE counts,
or both,27 and the new kid on the federal block, the federal death pen-
alty.28 When these issues reach the Seventh Circuit, it will be interesting
to see whether an identifiable Posner-Easterbrook approach will have
evolved and will have influenced the development of these areas of the
law.
Does it even make sense to discuss whether a particular intermedi-
ate federal court is more "important" than any other? At first blush, the
concept that any particular appellate court is more important than any
other may seem a bit troubling. In theory, federal criminal law should be
uniform in its applicability throughout the nation, and any substantial
conflict in the circuits should be resolved by the Supreme Court. And
while deviation on the application of any federal law is troubling, it is
especially troubling when federal criminal statutes and rules are subject
to divergent interpretations in different parts of the country.
The concern is certainly valid. Principles of federal prosecution are
"designed to promote consistency in application of federal laws."' 29 Simi-
larly the Supreme Court has emphasized that: [A]bsent plain indication
to the contrary, federal laws are not to be construed so that their applica-
tion is dependent on state law, "because the application of federal legisla-
tion is nationwide ...30
Not surprisingly, several high profile federal criminal law issues
27. A "mega-trial," as the term implies, refers to a trial with dozens of defendants and numer-
ous counts in the indictment, sometimes well over one hundred counts. Because of the incredible
burdens that such indictments place on the courts, jurors, and defense counsel, federal courts now
tend to support a district court's authority to sever mega-trials into more manageable pieces. For a
review of the El Ruk'n mega-trial in the Seventh Circuit, see George J. Cotsirilos & Matthew F.
Kennelly, Judge Aspen and the Case of the Severed Indictments, 6 CRIM. JUST. 18 (Summer 1991)
(discussing severing of "labyrinthine 305-page, 175-count indictment... nearly two inches thick and
weighing almost four pounds, [having] 38 defendants").
28. The constitutionality of the new federal death penalty provision in 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) was
upheld in United States v. Cooper, 754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. IlI. 1990), which was the first reported
decision on the subject. Seventh Circuit review was obviated when the jury convicted the defend-
ants, but chose not to impose the death penalty, opting for life imprisonment instead.
29. United States Attorneys' Manual § 9-27.140 (1984 ed.), reprinted in 8 THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE MANUAL, ch. 23A, § 140 (Supp. 1990). The Principles of Federal Prosecution continue
to reflect a seminal statement of the Justice Department's general approach to federal prosecutions.
30. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (criminal case) (quoting Dickerson v. New
Banner Inst., Inc. 460 U.S. 103, 119-120 (1983)).
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make their way to the Supreme Court on the fast track, quickly resolving
various intercircuit conflicts. Some constitutional federal criminal law
issues, such as the validity of preventive detention,31 the separation of
powers aspects of the federal sentencing guidelines,32 the independent
counsel, 33 and federal anti-flag burning legislation 34 seem to skyrocket to
the Supreme Court with unusual speed. 35 Other important federal crimi-
nal law issues, such as the pattern requirement under RICO, 36 and en-
hancements under various federal statutes37 seem to make their way to
the Court only after the conflicts in the circuits have gestated quite a
while.
Other significant issues are not quickly resolved by the Supreme
Court, and then sometimes haphazardly. For example, the "intangible
rights" theory in mail fraud prosecutions gestated in the appellate courts
for well over a decade before the Supreme Court decided to "resolve" the
issue.38 Its "resolution" in McNally v. United States39 only opened the
door to further conflict on how to deal with its aftermath 0 What consti-
tutes "extortion under color of official right" under the venerable Hobbs
Act still vexes federal courts of appeals. Now, some twenty years later,
the Supreme Court has renewed its interest in the statutory niceties of the
Hobbs Act and will purportedly resolve these long simmering intercircuit
conflicts.41 Its belated interest in the Hobbs Act may create a similarly
31. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
32. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
33. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
34. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
35. Congress sometimes has a role in this. The Flag Protection Act of 1989 contained an unu-
sual provision requiring that "[a]n appeal may be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United
States from any interlocutory or final judgment, decree, or order issued by a United States district
court ruling upon the constitutionality of [the Act]" and that "[t]he Supreme Court shall, if it has
not previously ruled on the question, accept jurisdiction over the appeal and advance on the docket
and expedite to the greatest extent possible." 18 U.S.C. § 700(d) (1989). In Mistretta, with no statute
specifically requiring fast track consideration of the issue, the Supreme Court took the unusual step
of granting review of a case from the district court before judgment was rendered from the interme-
diate appellate court. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371 (citing Supreme Court Rule 18, which allows for
the expedited procedure based on "imperative public importance" of the issue). See also Mistretta,
486 U.S. 1054 (1988) (granting certiorari before judgment).
36. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
37. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
38. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
39. Id.
40. Compare United States v. Keane, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1084
(1989) and United States v. Bush, 888 F.2d 1145 (7th Cir. 1989) (writ of coram nobis not available to
defendant who was convicted under pre-McNally intangible rights mail fraud theory) with United
States v. Mandel, 862 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988) (writ of coram nobis granted to vacate "intangible
rights" mail fraud conviction in light of McNally), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 906 (1989). See also Anno-
tation, supra note 21.
41. See McCormack v. United States, Ill S. Ct. 1807 (1991) (quid pro quo necessary for Hobbs
Act conviction of state legislator, regardless of whether money received was a legitimate contribu-
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confusing aftermath as was the case with McNally.42 Statutory issues
concerning RICO lurk in the appellate courts, even though the Supreme
Court periodically grants certiorari on RICO issues ostensibly to resolve
these issues.43 Whether the "exculpatory no" doctrine exists as a defense
to a charge of making a false statement has led to a wide divergence of
views in the circuits.44 As the war on drugs moves from the local courts
into the federal district courts, the number of cases raising important
fourth amendment issues is certain to rise. Congress' fondness for enact-
ing complex criminal statutes, coupled with generous use of federal con-
spiracy law and aiding and abetting liability under the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise Statute, are leading to splits in the circuits. The
Supreme Court seems willing to let these splits fester for the time being.
45
The list goes on and on.
Yet, these circuit splits, as troubling as they may be, should not sur-
prise any serious student of the federal judicial system. The Federal
Courts Study Committee has recognized that this is a serious problem,
and has called for further study to identify its precise dimensions.
46
Meanwhile, only recently has the Supreme Court again given recognition
to the fact there is such a thing as "the law of the Circuit. '47 However,
as the Federal Courts Study Committee noted, "[a] federal judicial sys-
tion); United States v. Evans, 910 F.2d 790 (1Ith Cir. 1990), aff'd, 60 U.S.L.W. 4411 (1992) (ques-
tion presented: whether "extortion under color of official right" prong of Hobbs Act requires proof
that public official did something to "induce" the payment.) The Seventh Circuit continues to be
active in the development of Hobbs Act public corruption doctrine. See United States v. McClain,
934 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 299 (7th Cir. 1991).
42. For a discussion of the history of the Hobbs Act and the Supreme Court's belated interest
in resolving various inter-circuit conflicts, see Dan K. Webb et al., Limiting Public Corruption Prose-
cutions Under the Hobbs Act: Will United States v. Evans Be the Next McNally?, 67 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 29 (1991).
43. See generally Braxton v. United States, III S. Ct. 1854, 1857 (1991) (principal purpose for
Supreme Court's use of certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve conflicts among Circuit Courts of
Appeals).
44. For the latest circuit to set forth the circuit split on this issue, see United States v. Steele,
933 F.2d 1313 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 303 (1991).
45. Compare United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1987)(aiding and abetting
liability cannot be utilized under 21 U.S.C. § 848), cert. denied sub nom. Abbamonte v. United
States, 24, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988) with United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.) (en
banc)(aiding and abetting liability can be utilized under 21 U.S.C. § 848), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901
(1989).
46. REPORT, supra note 8, at 125 (noting that in 1988 Supreme Court refused to review roughly
60-80 "direct" intercircuit conflicts presented to it by petitions for certiorari, and that number did
not include cases involving less direct conflicts (e.g., fundamentally inconsistent approaches to the
same issue)).
47. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561 (1988); see also Deborah Maranville, Nonacquies-
cence. Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471, 490
(1986); Henry J. Friendly, The "Law of the Circuit" and All That, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 406, 413
(1972); J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a
Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913 (1983).
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tem . . . must be able within a reasonable time to provide a nationally
binding construction [of federal law] needing a single, unified construc-
tion in order to serve their purpose."1
48
Is the Seventh Circuit developing an identifiable approach that con-.
tributes to the solution or is it adding to the problem by unnecessarily
creating intercircuit conflicts? Or, even worse, is the Seventh Circuit cre-
ating conflicts with applicable Supreme Court precedent? If the recent
past is any indication, the Supreme Court does not pay particular atten-
tion to the Seventh Circuit's criminal law jurisprudence--or at least has
shown no clear and consistent inclination to explicitly or implicitly
anoint it as some sort of first among equals or Supreme Court mind
reader. To illustrate this point, in the calendar year ending June 1988,
the Supreme Court granted only two petitions for writ of certiorari from
the Seventh Circuit for criminal cases.49 For the calendar year ending
June 1989, the Court granted certiorari for no criminal cases from the
Seventh Circuit.50 As of the date of this writing, only two Seventh Cir-
cuit criminal cases are pending before the Court. 51 One could argue that
the fact that the Supreme Court is leaving the Seventh Circuit criminal
cases alone implicitly suggests that it approves of its decisions. But this
conclusion is unwarranted. Statistically, the same could be said of every
circuit. For the year ending June 1989, the Court granted certiorari in
only 18 federal criminal cases, an average of less than two a circuit.
52
Nor has the Supreme Court made extensive use of Supreme Court
Rule 10(l)(c), which provides that, irrespective of a conflict in the cir-
cuits, certiorari may be granted, "when a ... court of appeals has de-
cided a federal question in a way that conflicts with applicable decisions
of [the Supreme Court]," to reign in possible renegade circuits. Thus, the
Supreme Court is letting stand virtually every federal appellate court
criminal law decision, although there is a significant amount of conflict in
48. See REPORT, supra note 8, at 125.
49. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTIcs-1989, at
531.
50. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990, at
532 [hereinafter CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990].
51. As this article entered the final editing stages, the Court decided Griffin v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 466 (1991). In Griffin, the Court unanimously affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision
holding that, in a federal prosecution, due process does not require a general verdict in a multiple-
object conspiracy to be set aside when the evidence is inadequate to support conviction as to one
object. Griffin represented no radical departure from established precedent. Perhaps the most inter-
esting aspect of Griffin is Justice Blackmun's concurrence recommending the use of special interrog-
atories in complex federal criminal cases, even if they are not constitutionally required. Id. at 475.
The Court also decided Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992). For a brief discussion, see
text accompanying notes 103-110 infra.
52. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990, supra note 50, at 532.
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those decisions.53
Moreover, based on the criminal cases the Court chooses to review,
no clear pattern emerges concerning how well the Supreme Court thinks
the Seventh Circuit is doing at anticipating cutting edge issues and
resolving them in a fashion consistent with the Supreme Court. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Cheek,54 an appeal arising from a criminal tax
prosecution, the Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that a good
faith misunderstanding of the law negates wilfulness, whether or not the
claimed belief or misunderstanding was objectively reasonable. On the
other hand, the Court upheld the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chapman
v. United States55 on the issue of whether the carrier medium for drugs
was to be counted in the weight for sentencing enhancement purposes.
For those interested in "keeping score" and see how the Supreme Court
tracks the supposedly monolithic Posner/Easterbrook position (and vise
versa), the Court's affirmance of the Seventh Circuit's Chapman decision
is unsatisfying. The Seventh Circuit heard the issue en banc, and split 6-
5, with Judge Easterbrook writing for the majority5 6 and Judge Posner
writing one of the two dissents.5 7
The end result is that the Seventh Circuit, like all other circuits, has
substantially free reign to develop its circuit caselaw, including substan-
tial reign to venture out into the "fenceline areas" of constitutional inter-
pretation. Accordingly, a systemic respect for binding precedent -
judicial self-control if you will - is an intermediate appellate court's
only real check on the creeping development of subtle, but significant
shifts away from established Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme
Court will only be able to provide a sporadic brake at best.
For this reason the emerging issue of whether Judges Posner and
Easterbrook are intentionally championing a jurisprudence ahead of the
Supreme Court wave is interesting. The systematic limitations inherent
in the federal court system will leave many of these decisions intact (at
least for a while), which, in turn, will put significant strain on the work-
ings of the entire federal court system. As a counterweight, other Sev-
enth Circuit Judges, most notably Judge Joel Flaum and Judge Kenneth
Ripple have emerged as a sort of moderating influence. They have tried
to keep the development of Seventh Circuit caselaw within recognizable
53. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (Supreme Court refused to review 60-80 di-
rect intercircuit conflicts in 1988 term).
54. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), vacating and remanding 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1989).
55. 111 S. Ct. 1919 (1991).
56. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.)(en banc).
57. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting).
Judge Posner also joined in Judge Cummings' dissent. Id. at 1326.
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Supreme Court parameters with several carefully considered and learned
opinions. 18
Before too quickly consigning Judges Easterbrook and Posner to the
netherworld of blatant and unrestrained Supreme Court interlopers (as
some have done),59 consider the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois.60 Rutan was a 5-4 decision hold-
ing that the Illinois patronage practice of hiring only those in a particular
political party was unconstitutional. The majority consisted of Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, Kennedy and O'Connor dissented. Justice Stevens, attempt-
ing to add a moderating voice, authored a separate concurrence where he
sought to draw on his former experiences of a Seventh Circuit judge to
explain that, contrary to Justice Scalia's propositions advanced in the
dissent, the majority opinion was a simple extension of long established
precedent.6' The dissent was not the least bit assuaged. 62 Two members
of the Rutan majority are no longer on the Court, having been replaced
by Justices with a judicial outlook presumably much more like Scalia
(and Posner and Easterbrook) than Stevens (or Flaum for that matter).
As a consequence, a shift in the Supreme Court may in time override the
moderating efforts emanating from the former Supreme Court and the
Seventh Circuit. Thus, the current Seventh Circuit debate must be
viewed through a prism that encompasses not only current Supreme
Court precedents, but also one which catches a glimpse of the future
Supreme Court landscape as well.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF REVIEW DEBATE
As set forth above, when confronted with a constitutional issue
grounded in procedural and caseload management dimensions, in some
cases Judge Posner and Judge Easterbrook are quite willing to go out on
a limb and, in the face of some startling disagreement, go several steps
beyond existing Supreme Court precedent.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1991) where Judge Flaum
authored an opinion which contained a scholarly analysis of the sprawling and elastic boundaries of
federal conspiracy law.
59. Professor Albert Alschuler, commenting on recent opinions by Judge Easterbrook, ob-
served that the Supreme Court has clearly rejected Easterbrook's thinking, further stating "[i]t does
seem to be that Posner and Easterbrook are ignoring the fact that there's a Supreme Court out
there." Bill Grady, Merrill Goozner, John O'Brien, A Judicial War of Words and More, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 27, 1990, at C3.
60. 497 U.S. 62, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
61. Id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2740 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. See, e.g., id. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 2749 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Stevens'
concurrence); id. at 2754 n.4 (same).
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To fully appreciate this point, one need only contrast it to how the
court properly yields to Supreme Court precedent when it wants to. It is
axiomatic that settled constitutional doctrine cannot, or should not, be
changed at the intermediate appellate court level. The Seventh Circuit
knows that rule well. Indeed, it can even be a docile adherent to century-
old and arguably obsolete Supreme Court authority when it wants to.
Risser v. Thompson 63 is illustrative. There, in an opinion written by
Judge Posner, the court dismissed a constitutional challenge based on the
guarantee of republican government clause,64 on the grounds of nonjusti-
ciability, because guarantee clause jurisprudence "is too well entrenched
to be overturned at our level of the judiciary. ' ' 65 Although Risser was a
civil case, because of the potential criminal law application of the guaran-
tee clause, 66 the court's treatment of the guarantee clause is instructive
on how it may handle criminal law issues with a constitutional
dimension.
Another Posner opinion, United States v. Masters,67 provides an-
other example. There, the court was surprisingly quiet when it declined
an opportunity to strike down RICO as unconstitutional on vagueness
grounds. 6 The court certainly had an opening provided by the Supreme
Court, as at least four Supreme Court Justices appear to support that
view.69 However, as will be discussed in a moment, Judge Posner and
Judge Easterbrook are not bashful about enunciating "new" constitu-
tional doctrine under far less certain circumstances.
Another example of obedient adherence to even arguably unclear
Supreme Court precedent is Hanrahan v. Theiret.70 There, the district
court granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that incriminating
statements of a non-testifying codefendant had been erroneously admit-
63. 930 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 180 (1991).
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
65. Risser, 930 F.2d at 552.
66. See Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause As A Basis for Federal Prosecutions of State
and Local Officials 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367 (1989).
67. 924 F.2d 1362 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2019 (1991).
68. 924 F.2d at 1367.
69. See David W. Fassett, Mother of Mercy, Is This the End of RICO?, 6 CRIM. JUST. 12
(Spring 1991) (four sitting Justices are inclined to invalidate RICO and others have admitted that
the pattern requirement defies definition, author suggests that RICO's fate is uncertain). In light of
the Seventh Circuit's apparent lack of interest in trail blazing on this issue, two Seventh Circuit
practitioners hold out little hope that the Seventh Circuit will strike down RICO on vagueness
grounds. Patrick A. Tuite & John L. Hines, Jr., RICO's Pattern Requirement in the Seventh Circuit,
CBA RECORD 18 (March 1991). In a later case, Chief Judge Bauer, joined by Judges Posner and
Manion, acknowledged Justice Scalia's "invitation" to strike down RICO, but summarily rejected
the contention and relegated the "discussion" of the issue to a footnote. United States v. Glecier,
923 F.2d 496, 497 n.l (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 209 (1991).
70. 933 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 209 (1991).
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ted. The Seventh Circuit reversed, and reinstated the conviction after
applying a very straight-laced harmless error analysis as ostensibly re-
quired by Chapman v. California.71 Judge Wood, writing for a unani-
mous panel, acknowledged that the "Supreme Court has not always been
precise in choosing words to articulate the Chapman standard" 72 and
implied that there was a certain "looseness" concerning the applicable
state of the law. In finding any error harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and reinstating the conviction, the Seventh Circuit stated, "[tjhe
Supreme Court has yet to overrule or formally modify Chapman, how-
ever, and we must continue to respect its holding until that day."'73
The above pronouncements are somewhat comical when contrasted
with other Seventh Circuit pronouncements in areas where some mem-
bers of the court may be getting ahead of the Supreme Court wave on
some constitutional law issues. This debate has surfaced in at least three
opinions, and suggests that a disturbing split exists within the court.
In United States v. Chaidez,74 the majority opinion, authored by
Judge Easterbrook, alters fourth amendment "arrest" jurisprudence in
an area where the Supreme Court has spoken clearly and often. Judge
Easterbrook claimed that the law concerning probable cause determina-
tions was in a state of "transition, '75 citing his own concurring opinion
as support. 76 Judge Ripple, in dissent, took serious issue with the charac-
terization that the law was "in transition," calling Judge Easterbrook's
pronouncements both "premature and presumptuous. '77
The trend was again evident in United States v. McKinney,78 where
the three judge panel yielded three separate opinions. All three judges
concurred in the result affirming the conviction, but there was a spirited
colloquy between Judge Posner and Judge Flaum concerning the applica-
ble standard of review for whether a magistrate had correctly concluded
that probable cause for a search had been established. Judge Flaum,
writing the majority opinion, recounted Supreme Court precedents and
determined that the issue of whether probable cause existed for a magis-
trate to issue a search warrant should be reviewed under a moderately
invigorating "substantial basis" standard.79
71. 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
72. Hanrahan, 933 F.2d at 1336 n.17.
73. Id. at 1337 n.17.
74. 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 209 (1991).
75. Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1196.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1203, n.1 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
78. 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990).
79. Id. at 408-416.
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In concurrence, Judge Posner vigorously argued that the issue, in-
deed all "fact based" constitutional issues, should be reviewed under a
more deferential "clearly erroneous" standard, and thus appeared willing
to extend past settled Supreme Court jurisprudence on the vital issue of
the applicable standards of review of district court determinations of var-
ious constitutional claims.80 He concluded by noting that a trend was
afoot supporting this position and that "we should not fear to reject [the
prevailing standard of review] for fear of being called innovative." 8'
Responding to Judge Posner, Judge Flaum exclaimed that, when
weighed against the need to safeguard constitutional rights, "expediency
is a weak substitute for meaningful appellate review." '82 He further de-
nied that the "steady trend" purportedly identified by Judge Posner even
existed and "suggest[ed], instead, that it is primarily an initiative of two
very learned and, in this instance, overly innovative, jurists displeased
with the state of the law."
'8 3
The importance of this issue is belied by its seemingly semantic and
technical nature. Judge Posner puts a great premium on appellate case
load efficiency. In his concurrence, Posner cited the Report of the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee84 to support his position. He claimed that
"because the dramatic increases in federal judicial workloads in recent
years have fallen so heavily on the federal courts of appeals, it is no sur-
prise that there has been a steady trend toward limiting the scope of ap-
pellate review of determinations of fact-specific issues."
85
Here, Judge Posner has exposed his agenda. Without clear direction
from the Supreme Court, Posner appears quite willing to alter significant
constitutional doctrine in order to achieve the "greater goal" of appellate
caseload management. This is troubling for at least three reasons. First,
the practical effect of more deferential standards of review is to insulate
incorrect decisions from meaningful review. Judge Flaum noted how
skewed this goal can be when weighed against the vindication of consti-
tutional rights. Apparently, Judge Posner is untroubled by this prospect.
Second, while the overt manipulation of any legal doctrine to effect
caseload management is troubling to begin with, it becomes grotesque
when the Constitution is being manipulated.
80. Id. at 418-23 (Posner, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 423 (Posner, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 412.
83. Id. at 411 n.4. Judge Flaum also added that Judge Posner had even acknowledged in an
earlier opinion that "the Supreme Court has stubbornly refused to yield to his [Posner's] logic." Id.
at 411 n.6.
84. REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
85. McKinney, 919 F.2d at 420 (Posner, J., concurring).
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Third, Judge Posner's advocacy of this type of caseload manage-
ment represents a curious permutation of separation of powers principles
emanating from a judicial quarter that usually pays significant respect to
that cornerstone constitutional doctrine. Congress has been given the
constitutional role of defining the appellate jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Judge Posner's approach appears in tension with that role. Nev-
ertheless, a few months after McKinney was decided, the Supreme Court
decided McClesky v. Zant.8 6 There, in a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court
effectively reinterpreted the habeas corpus rules to limit severely a habeas
petitioner's right to seek federal habeas corpus review. The dissent char-
acterized the majority opinion as a "[radical departure] from the norms
that inform the proper judicial function."87 The dissent further observed
that Congress had recently rejected the identical proposed statutory
change that the majority had imposed through judicial fiat and causti-
cally remarked that "it is axiomatic that this Court does not act as a
backup legislature of failed attempts to amend existing statutes."' 8
Judge Posner may have read his Supreme Court tea leaves correctly.
In Zant, a majority of the Supreme Court has apparently implicitly en-
dorsed the principle that - at least with respect to statutory issues -
caseload management is a proper principle to guide the judicial function.
Thus, if Congress won't heed the call to limit the caseload of the federal
judiciary, the judiciary will do it itself.8 9
In all likelihood, this will be the defining federal courts issue in the
nineties. Recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist has been extremely vocal in
asking Congress to take responsible measures to decrease, and not in-
crease, the case loads of the federal courts.9° Given that Congress' polit-
ical objectives are not necessarily compatible with the Chief Justice's
concerns, this will likely become a flashpoint issue, if it hasn't already. 9'
86. 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991).
87. Id. at 1477 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1482.
89. Zant cannot be read as clearly endorsing Judge Posner's approach in McKinney because
Zant concerned a statutory issue rather than an issue of constitutional interpretation.
90. In 1989, Chief Justice Rehnquist took an unusual step and wrote an editorial asking Con-
gress to enact Civil RICO Reform. William H. Rehnquist, Get RICO Cases Out of My Courtroom,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 1989, at AIO col. 4. More recently, concerned that Congress was endangering
the quality and credibility of the federal courts, the Chief Justice opposed legislative proposals under
consideration in Congress that would allow federal prosecution of virtually any case in which a gun
was used to commit a murder, and voiced significant caseload concerns about the proposed Violence
Against Women Act. See Expanding Federal Court Role Opposed, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 1992, at
A29.
91. Some members of Congress have clearly stated that they do not care about the burden on
the federal courts. The implication would seem to be that the federal courts' efforts to develop
doctrine as a case load management technique is illegitimate in any form, and will be aggressively
challenged by Congress. For example, in a discussion over a proposed federal statute that would
[Vol. 67:3
SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN THE NINETIES
Thus, the emerging "innovative" caseload management doctrines of the
Seventh Circuit could be subject to intense nationwide scrutiny.
Finally, the standard of review/caseload management issue was evi-
dent again in the Seventh Circuit's en banc consideration of Hunter v.
Clark92 There, Judges Posner and Easterbrook, in a separate concur-
rence, asserted that on collateral review, constitutional error need not be
shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in order to preserve a
conviction - that such a standard was too difficult. 93 Here, they did not
even bother to try to cite controlling Supreme Court authority but were
willing to gamble that apparently concurring views of two Justices would
someday carry the day. 94 This is a rather brazen example of a new type
of federal criminal appellate jurisprudence at work.95
And it contrasts sharply with the manner in which other circuits
grapple with fenceline constitutional issues arguably "in transition." For
example, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,9
6
the Third Circuit confronted whether Pennsylvania's restrictive abortion
legislation was constitutional. The court recognized that a series of re-
cent Supreme Court abortion rights decisions and changes in the Court's
personnel had cast serious doubt on whether the Roe standard currently
commanded a majority of the Supreme Court. After considered analysis
of these cases, including all of the concurrences and partial concurrences,
effectively federalize every murder committed with a firearm, the Judicial Conference of the United
States opposed the bill, claiming it could "flood the federal courts." Michael Isikoff, Crime Bill's
Costs Worry U.S. Judges, WASH. PosT, July 22, 1991, at Al. Senator Alphonse D'Amato, the bill's
sponsor responded:
I could care a hoot about the fact that it may create a burden for the [federal] courts ....
Better a burden for the courts than the continued killing and violence on our streets ....
When a woman gets shot and killed and loses three babies, you're telling me I should be
worried about whether the courts should take on additional cases?
Id. at AS. In a related vein, Jay Stephens, the U.S. Attorney in Washington, D.C., told the local
federal district court bench that they should stop complaining about their allegedly crowded dockets
and further suggested the judges don't work very hard. Tracy Thompson, Stop Complaining, Ste-
phens Tells Judges, WASH. PosT, June 8, 1991, at BI.
92. 934 F.2d 856 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 388 (1991).
93. Hunter, 934 F.2d at 865 (Easterbrook, J., concurring with Posner, J.) (suggesting state need
not surmount such a high [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt] hurdle).
94. Id. at 866 (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 207-13 (O'Connor and Scalia, JJ.,
concurring)).
95. The resistance to having Supreme Court doctrine refashioned at the appellate level leads to
some amusing unanimous opinions. In Beringer v. Sheahan, 934 F.2d 110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 641 (1991), Judge Flaum authored an opinion joined by Judges Posner and Manion. In
rejecting a defense contention concerning a questionable construction of Supreme Court precedent,
Judge Flaum noted: "Inferior courts sometimes, it is true, wrench the words of the Supreme Court
out of context or seize upon stray bits of dicta that occasionally find their way into even the most
narrowly tailored of the Court's opinions, but this is not such a case." Beringer, 934 F.2d at 113 n.2.
There is little doubt this passage was directed more toward the other members of the panel rather
than toward the unsuccessful litigant.
96. 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 60 U.S.L.W. 3715 (1992).
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the Third Circuit attempted to cobble a reasoned estimate of the
Supreme Court's current position and held that the controlling opinion
in a splintered 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court is that of the justice or
justices who concur on the "narrowest grounds. ' 97 Whether the Third
Circuit's approach is ultimately determined to be correct is problematic.
But right or wrong, its approach at least embodies a sincere effort to base
its constitutional reasoning on what it believes to be a position that cur-
rently commands the support of a majority of the Supreme Court. Judge
Posner's and Easterbrook's approach to some of these constitutional is-
sues, "innovative" as it may be, does not appear to include that
ingredient.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judge Posner's and Judge Easterbrook's views are undoubtedly
firmly held and they will continue to influence the development of Sev-
enth Circuit criminal law doctrine. However, until the Supreme Court
clearly indicates those views command a majority of the Supreme Court,
the likely result will be the continuing proliferation of various degrees of
intercircuit conflicts. The innovative spirit of the Seventh Circuit, un-
checked, could cause significant disruption to a federal court system al-
ready showing serious signs of strain.98 This undoubtedly explains why
97. 947 F. 2d at 693-94.
98. The Circuit's recent experience with the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute ("CCE"),
21 U.S.C. § 848, provides an example. In United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989), the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to follow the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 381-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nor.
Abbanmonte v. United States, 485 U.S. 1021 (1988), which had held that, based on a review of the
relevant legislative history, aider and abettor liability could not be imposed under the CCE statute.
In United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 206 (1990), the court
had to define the term "continuing series of violations." Despite the fact that seven other circuits
that had considered the issue had determined that a drug conspiracy could be included and the total
number of violations had to be at least three to constitute the requisite "series" of violations, Judge
Easterbrook determined drug conspiracies could not count, but held that only two violations were
needed to establish a series. Judge Easterbrook concluded: "This brings us into harmony in result,
although not in exposition, with the seven other circuits that set a minimum of three violations and
allow the included conspiracy to serve as one. It also means that [the defendant's] conviction for the
CCE crime stands." 905 F.2d at 1105. But the "disharmony in exposition" created a needless in-
tercircuit conflict. Judge Easterbrook's master stroke did not alter the result in the case. It is hard
to gauge just why the Circuit is willing to develop an aberrant CCE case law. Perhaps this can be
explained as another of Judge Easterbrook's attempts to rid the Circuit of unnecessary and "ineffi-
cient" conspiracy charges.
The seemingly needless creation of intercircuit conflict becomes even more interesting for at
least two other reasons. First, it flatly contradicts a recommendation of The Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, which, as noted above, in other contexts, appears to carry uncommon
persuasive weight. The REPORT recommended: "[W]hen a court of appeals reviews a case raising
an issue already decided in another circuit, it should accord considerable respect to that earlier
decision." REPORT, supra note 8, at 129. The REPORT further recommends that:
[i]ntercircuit conflict should be created only if a majority of the active judges of the court
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Judge Ripple and Judge Flaum have responded in the unusually sharp
manner that they have.
Productively channelled, the Circuit's innovative spirit will un-
doubtedly serve as an impetus for the Supreme Court to resolve key con-
stitutional issues. It could also go a long way towards forcing a
reevaluation of several significant federal criminal law issues not of con-
stitutional dimension that are currently in a state of doctrinal confusion
within the circuits and which are unlikely to reach the Supreme Court in
the near future.99 Thus, the Seventh Circuit should be expected to play a
are convinced that the earlier decision in another circuit is definitely wrong. Some intercir-
cuit conflicts could undoubtedly be prevented by more deference to prior decisions reached
by other courts which are of equal rank, are part of the same national system, and have
equal responsibility for interpretation of federal law.
Id.
Second, and even more instructive, the Baker court failed to comply with the Seventh Circuit's
own Local Rule 40 (f). Rule 40(f) is not as extreme as the Study Committee recommendation set
forth above. Nonetheless, it was promulgated largely to eliminate the needless creation of inter-
circuit conflicts. Rule 40(f) provides:
Rehearing sua sponte before decision. A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this
court adopting a position which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a
conflict between or among the circuits shall not be published unless circulated among the
active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue
of whether the position should be adopted. In the discretion of the panel, a proposed
opinion which would establish a new rule or procedure may be similarly circulated before
it is issued. When the position is adopted by the panel after compliance with this proce-
dure, the opinion, when published, shall contain a footnote worded, depending on the cir-
cumstances, in substance as follows: "This opinion has been circulated among all of the
judges of this court in regular active service. (No judge favored, or a majority did not
favor) a rehearing en banc on the question of (e.g. overruling Doe v. Roe). (Emphasis
added.)
Given the nature of the issues in Baker and the manner in which they were decided, compliance
with the Rule 40(f) procedures was required. The Circuit's refusal in applicable cases to follow its
own mandatory commands suggest the Circuit may not be as sensitive to the problems of intercircuit
conflicts as it might appear. A brief perusal of several Seventh Circuit decisions indicates that com-
pliance with Rule 40(f) occurs most often where a proposed opinion would arguably overrule a prior
decision of the Seventh Circuit, but adherence to the rule is more lax when the issue concerns the
possible creation of an intercircuit conflict. For an example where the court complied with Rule
40(f) with respect to a possible intercircuit conflict, see United States v. Canino, 949 F.2d 928, 932
n.* (7th Cir. 1991) (specifically noting compliance with Rule 40 (f) and Circuit's decision not to
rehear case en banc on the question of possible intercircuit conflict with decision of Third Circuit),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1940 (1992).
In any event, as more new complex criminal statutes make their way to the Seventh Circuit,
there should be some concern that the Circuit may yet again go it alone, thus exacerbating the
problems of intercircuit conflicts. This kind of "innovation," appearing very much like rote aca-
demic exercise, in the larger scheme of things, is not particularly helpful to the efficient functioning a
federal court system.
99. Two issues come to mind, but the list is far from exhaustive. The first issue concerns the
availability of "theory of defense" jury instructions. Difficult analytical questions arise concerning
the quantum of proof required to put a particular defense in issue, and the circumstances under
which the court should give a particular theory of defense instruction. A significant amount of
uncertainty and disagreement still exists throughout the circuits. See generally, Adam H. Kurland,
Prosecuting 01' Man River.- The Fifth Amendment. the Good Faith Defense, and the Non-Testifying
Defendant, 51 U. PiTT. L. REV. 841 (1990). Here, the Seventh Circuit's inclination to be innovative
in a productive manner would be welcome. To date, the Circuit's record on these issues is mixed.
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preeminent role as a federal appellate court in the nineties.
Many circuits, including the Seventh, have held that receipt of a specific good faith instruction is not
required, as long as the other instructions make clear that specific intent to defraud must be found
beyond a reasonable doubt. On the other hand, other Seventh Circuit cases have held that a defend-
ant in a criminal case is entitled to have the jury consider any theory of defense which is supported
by law and which has some foundation in the evidence, however tenuous. Partly because of each
circuit's reluctance or inability to resolve its own inherently irreconcilable authority, and to frankly
resolve all of the related issues, reversals occur on this issue fairly often, but the decisions seem little
more than ad hoc random judgments. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 913 F. 2d 388 (7th Cir.
1990). The Supreme Court has recognized the conflict among the courts of appeals, but has not
resolved it. See Green v. United States, 474 U.S. 925 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
The Seventh Circuit has shown some interest to confront the thicket of quantum of proof
problems for the presentation of the entrapment defense. In United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714
(7th Cir. 1991), the Seventh Circuit set down an exceedingly difficult test before a defendant may
receive an entrapment instruction, holding that "extraordinary inducement" by the government was
required before a jury question on entrapment was generated. The Evans approach to the availabil-
ity of an entrapment instruction seems somewhat stricter than most of the other circuits. The Sev-
enth Circuit's strict approach to the availability of defense theory of the case instructions also seems
at odds with the more liberal principle that it implicitly endorsed in Walters.
Definitional problems with hearsay also present a hopelessly convoluted area where a coherent
innovative doctrinal reevaluation would be particularly welcome. Hearsay issues relating to evi-
dence of state of mind are of vital importance in criminal prosecutions, where state of mind evidence
often is determinative on whether guilt can be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the
myriad of evidentiary issues are subject only to appellate review for abuse of discretion, this tends to
make Supreme Court resolution of a particular issue particularly uninviting. It also tends to hinder
the development of a "correct" and balanced body of appellate case law. See, e.g., United States v.
Mokol, 939 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1991) (appellate court noting it "may not have decided issue of
admissibility of [proffered evidence] in the same way as district court," but trial court determination
was not an abuse of discretion). Here the Seventh Circuit could take a trail blazing role in the
development of i more coherent, and correct, body of Federal Evidence Law.
An academic debate has been long brewing concerning whether "verbal conduct" which implies
something other than what was explicitly said constitutes hearsay. A related definitional problem
exists with statements ostensibly offered as "circumstantial evidence of state of mind." Several
scholars have taken the position that such statements are not hearsay. See generally, Glen Weis-
senberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 145
(1991); James McElheny, It's Notfor Its Truth, 77 A.B.A.J. 80 (Oct. 1991). Courts often fall for this
trap, and admit evidence without exposing it to the hearsay gauntlet. On the other hand, other
scholars have disagreed with that conclusion. See generally, PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON
LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 268-70 (2d ed. 1990). To make matters more confusing,
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) excepts from hearsay exclusion statements of then existing state of
mind, but that rule is itself deceptively confusing.
This hearsay maze is far too complicated to be sorted out here and no such effort has been
attempted. Suffice it is to say that hearsay definitional issues have too long been the exclusive do-
main of law professors, and a case raising fundamental hearsay definitional problems is not likely to
appear on the Supreme Court docket anytime soon. Accordingly, the time is ripe for an innovative
intermediate appellate court to reevaluate this issue with vigor.
The Seventh Circuit has already made several promising recent forays into the hearsay defini-
tional thicket. See, e.g., United States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.) ("statement" by a non-
testifying defendant that a plan was "crazy" was hearsay, but admissible under the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 969 (1988); United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d
1125 (7th Cir. 1991) (evidence (letters written by the donor expressing his love to the defendant) was
not hearsay because it was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but was offered for the
purpose of showing that she believed the things given to her were gifts-court acknowledges the
possible unfair confusion of admission of evidence that would otherwise be excludable as hearsay,
holding that fair trial concerns overrode any possible evidentiary bar to the admission of the evi-
dence); United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir. 1990) (when the defendant sought to
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This symposium does not pretend to present a comprehensive over-
view of every aspect of Seventh Circuit criminal law jurisprudence. The
principal articles focus on several criminal law issues from different per-
spectives. Dan Webb, former United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois, Steven Molo, and James Hurst take a renewed look at
an old issue-the Hobbs Act-which has a venerable history in the Sev-
enth Circuit. Hobbs Act jurisprudence might be ripe for a fundamental
reevaluation in light of the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari
in United States v. Evans.1°°
This symposium also offers an analysis of the Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines constitute
an enormous and evolving body of new federal criminal law whose devel-
opment has been left largely to the federal courts of appeals. 01 Terence
MacCarthy, Executive Director of the Federal Defender Program in the
Northern District of Illinois, and Nancy Murnighan, analyze the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Compared
to past federal sentencing practices, the Guidelines provide more avenues
for both the defense and prosecution to appeal sentencing decisions. As a
consequence, a potential for the development of a more "balanced" ap-
pellate caselaw is present. In the authors' view, the Circuit has failed, at
least at this point, to develop the hoped-for balanced approach to the
application of the Guidelines.
Next, the symposium offers a forward look at an emerging federal
admit his own statements via the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, the court implied the
argument had some merit, but dismissed the argument, holding that "[t]o a limited extent,
Heidecke's arguments do raise possibly legitimate exceptions to the hearsay rule," but finding error
harmless). Id. at 1163. However, even Heidecke is illustrative of the Seventh Circuit's willingness to
confront the hearsay definitional problems, since the court at least recognized the dangers to the
hearsay rule if too loose a standard was employed in defining statements as non-hearsay. See id. at
1163 (defendant's view that statements were not hearsay "would restyle the hearsay rule into an
evidentiary presumption of admissibility"). It is worth noting that, often, prosecution efforts to
admit evidence as non-hearsay when offered to show state of mind, often receive a warmer and less
critical reception by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Colston, 936 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1991)
(admission of prosecution offered evidence to show state of mind, and thus not hearsay, not an abuse
of discretion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 403 (1991).
The above cases are not necessarily consistent or all encompassing. Much more needs to be
done. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit should build on these cases and take the lead and continue
to develop the comprehensive analysis of the hearsay definitional problems. No better use of the
Circuit's tremendous intellectual firepower could be made.
100. 910 F.2d 790 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 2850 (1991). As this symposium
entered its final editing stages, the Supreme Court decided Evans. See Webb et al., supra note 42, at
Postscript, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. at 50.
101. To date, the Supreme Court has decided a handful of Guidelines cases. In contrast, the
American Bar Association Committee on Criminal Justice Reports that the twelve Circuit Courts of
Appeals have published over 1,200 opinions interpreting the guidelines. Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: An Overview, Update and New Strategies i (ABA Section on Criminal Justice 1991). That
number has increased significantly in the one year since the publication of that study.
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criminal law issue, the federal death penalty. Because of its political and
election year overtones, this issue is likely to be emphasized to a degree
far disproportionate to its real importance in the federal criminal justice
system. As already noted, by happenstance, the Northern District of Illi-
nois, within the Seventh Circuit, was home to the first federal prosecu-
tion where a federal death penalty was sought since the Supreme Court
decided Gregg v. Georgia.10 2 Professor Sandra Jordan, a former Assis-
tant United States Attorney and former Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor,
analyzes the federal death penalty law which puts the Seventh Circuit,
along with its sister circuits, back in the federal death penalty business.
This business will likely pick up as the Congress continues to grapple
with proposed legislation that would expand the federal death penalty to
cover over fifty additional offenses. Professor Jordan notes that the basic
presumption that the federal courts will be able to find experienced death
penalty defense lawyers may be put to a severe test in states where there
is no state death penalty, and hence a dearth of experienced death pen-
alty litigators. This issue will be of significant concern in the Seventh
Circuit, where any federal death penalty prosecution in Wisconsin, a
state that does not have a death penalty, will likely raise serious constitu-
tional issues concerning the imposition of the federal death penalty.
Finally, given that much of the undercurrent of the direction of the
Seventh Circuit derives from whether Judges Posner and Easterbrook are
so impatient that they are ignoring existing Supreme Court precedent, a
careful look at one issue where the Circuit may be getting ahead of the
Supreme Court is in order. Stepping into this abyss is Professor Anne
Bowen Poulin, former Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern
District of Illinois. Professor Poulin explores the Seventh Circuit's
fourth amendment "arrest" jurisprudence, and rather politely concludes
that the Circuit is moving beyond the parameters enunciated by the
Supreme Court. Some of the larger themes that may emanate from that
analysis have been highlighted in this Foreword.
Given the relatively short fuse that accompanies many federal crimi-
nal law issues, (and the relatively long fuse attached to law review pro-
duction schedules), it is possible that some of the issues addressed herein
may have been "resolved" by the Supreme Court by the time this sympo-
sium goes to print. But that really is not relevant. By focusing on the
spectrum of a decision-making process-be it the past (Hobbs Act analy-
102. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of various
statutory procedural safeguards which the Court determined were sufficient to ensure that the death
penalty would be imposed in a just and rational manner.
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sis); the present (the Circuit's approach to the Sentencing Guideline and
fourth amendment arrest jurisprudence), and the future (the likely issues
arising from the federal death penalty statute)-the symposium is meant
to transcend particular resolution, by the Supreme Court or by legisla-
tion, of any particular issue. After digesting these several perspectives,
perhaps the reader can taste a directional flavor of the Seventh Circuit as
a Criminal law court.
V. POSTSCRIPT
On March 6, 1992, the Supreme Court decided Williams v. United
States.10 3 In Williams, a case arising out of the Seventh Circuit, the
Court held, 7-2, that where a district court incorrectly applies a guideline
and relies on an improper ground in departing upward from a guideline
range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a reviewing court may
not affirm the sentence based solely on its independent assessment that
the departure was reasonable. 04 Rather, a remand is required unless the
reviewing court can ascertain that the district court would have imposed
the same sentence had it not relied on the improper factor or factors.
Thus, the Court vacated the lower court opinion, which had held that a
remand was unnecessary if the reviewing court's independent assessment
of the valid factors concluded that the sentence was "reasonable." 10 5
Justice O'Connor, writing for the seven Justice majority, sternly admon-
ished the Seventh Circuit:
The development of the guideline sentencing regime has not changed
our view that, except to the extent specifically directed by statute, "it is
not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of
the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sen-
tence." ...
[I]t is the prerogative of the district court, not the court of ap-
peals, to determine in the first instance, the sentence that should be
imposed in light of certain factors properly considered by the
Guidelines. 10
6
Williams is, at bottom, a decision concerning the scope of appellate
review and use of judicial resources. The Seventh Circuit's decision be-
low was the obverse of the more common situation where an appellate
court applies cursory, harmless error review to affirm the lower court,
103. 112 S. Ct. 1112 (1992) (vacating and remanding 910 F.2d 1574 (7th Cir. 1990)).
104. 112 S. Ct. 1112. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. Justices White and Kennedy
dissented.
105. United States v. Williams, 910 F.2d 1574 (7th Cir. 1990). The panel consisted of Judges
Wood, Ripple and Senior Judge Eschbach. Id. at 1576.
106. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1121-22 (citations omitted).
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thereby obviating the need for a remand for further judicial proceedings.
Here, the Seventh Circuit had endorsed a type of hyper-appellate review,
an independent assessment of reasonableness, to achieve the same result
- affirmance of a district court result that would obviate the need for a
remand for further judicial proceedings.
Read narrowly, Williams is a technical decision concerning statu-
tory interpretation.10 7 Thus, one must be careful not to read too much
into the decision. Nonetheless, Williams presented the Court with an
opportunity to review a Seventh Circuit decision containing implicit, yet
significant caseload management ramifications, and the Court rather re-
soundingly declined to endorse the Seventh Circuit's relatively moderate
approach. '0 8 For those Seventh Circuit members who advocate an even
more radical approach to resolving issues imbued with caseload manage-
ment and standard of review ramifications, Williams hardly suggests that
the dawn of their new day is imminent. 109 In the aftermath of Williams,
the manner in which the Seventh Circuit confronts caseload management
and standard of review issues merits even more scrutiny. Stay tuned."I0
107. The case centered around whether departure decisions are properly reviewed under 18
U.S.C. § 3742 (f)(1) or are to be reviewed exclusively under section 3742 (0(2).
108. It is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit panel that decided Williams did not include
either Judge Posner or Judge Easterbrook. See Williams, 910 F.2d at 1576 (panel consists of Judges
Wood, Ripple, and Senior Judge Eschbach).
109. If the "radical" approach to caseload management is limited solely to advocating deferen-
tial standards of review for virtually all trial court decisions, Williams conceivably may be seen as
not inconsistent with that approach. However, if the concept of "caseload management" is viewed
more broadly, then Williams cannot easily be interpreted as placing a super priority on caseload
management concerns of the federal court system.
110. Two recent cases further illustrate the escalating tensions within the Seventh Circuit on
constitutional standard of review issues in criminal cases. First, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d
1363 (7th Cir. 1991), the court returned to the vexing issue of determining the appropriate standard
of "harmless error" review on collateral review of state court judgments. Bucking its own prece-
dents, the law in many other circuits, and arguably the Supreme Court as well, the court, per an
opinion by Judge Easterbrook, held that "the standard of harmlessness on collateral enforcement of
prophylactic rules is whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determin-
ing the jury's verdict.'" Id. at 1375. Under this standard, establishing that an error was harmless is
not as difficult as having to establish that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." The
practical effect is that more errors will be deemed harmless and the habeas relief will be less available
to remedy admitted errors below. The Brecht opinion is replete with references to federalism and
court efficiency concerns. See id. at 1372-73. This position was foreshadowed in Judge Easter-
brook's and Judge Posner's en banc concurrence in Hunter v. Clark, 934 F.2d 856, 865 (7th Cir.)
(concurring opinion), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 388 (1991). See discussion at text accompanying notes
92-95 supra.
Unlike the Third Circuit's efforts to predict Supreme Court doctrine in light of subsequent
Supreme Court opinions and changes in the Court's personnel, see text accompanying notes 96-97
supra, Brecht seems grounded in a naked reevaluation of existing precedent. This shunting aside of
controlling precedent by an intermediate appellate court was not accepted quietly. Five Seventh
Circuit judges, including Judges Flaum and Ripple, voted in favor of a rehearing in banc, but fell one
vote short. Brecht, 944 F.2d at 1376 n.*. Judge Cudahay, the third panel member, concurred in the
judgment but also voted to rehear the case in banc. Id. at 1376. In his concurrence, he indicated
that he believed the panel majority improperly overruled the existing Supreme Court "harmless
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beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 19 (1967). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Brecht, 60 U.S.L.W. 3827 (1992), thus insuring that the Court
will confront at least one Seventh Circuit generated constitutional standard of review issue during
the 1992-93 Term.
Second, in United States v. Spears, et al., 1992 App. Lexis 12298 (7th Cir. (as amended) June 9,
1992), a panel of the Seventh Circuit (which included Judge Posner) elevated a prior Judge Posner
concurrence to the law of the circuit at the expense of other Seventh Circuit precedent. This time,
United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1990), was the casualty. In Spears, the panel
adopted a deferential clearly erroneous standard of review for reviewing probable cause determina-
tions in warrant and non-warrant cases. Spears, 1992 App. Lexis 12298, at *26. The McKinney
majority had held that such determinations in warrant cases were subject to some intermediate level
appellate scrutiny more deferential than de novo but less deferential than clear error. As with Brecht,
the end result is the development of doctrine that removes classes of constitutional issues from signif-
icant appellate review.
This time, four members of the court (including Judges Flaum and Ripple) dissented from a
denial of a rehearing en banc. The four judges criticized the panel for demeaning the status of the
Circuit's fourth amendment jurisprudence and of "scuttling searching appellate review in this crucial
area." Spears, 1992 App. Lexis 12298, at *65. (Flaum, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc).
The dissent further decried the panel's "rush to extinguish [McKinney]" without benefit of full brief-
ing and argument," id. at *60, and further lamented that the "unfortunate consequences [of the
panel's decision] will be the curtailment of th[e] dialogue" of meaningful appellate review of magis-
trates' probable cause determinations which had served to promote accuracy and uniformity of the
application of the fourth amendment. Id. at *63. Finally, for good measure, Judge Flaum appeared
to mock the law and economics jargon for which Judge Posner is famous by contending that the
"clear error" standard would herald a "new 'unregulated' marketplace of probable cause." Id. at
*64.
The judicial pyrotechnics of the Seventh Circuit are really only beginning. The Seventh Circuit
in the nineties will certainly be interesting.
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